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THE AVAILABILITY OF EXCESS DAMAGES FOR
WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO HONOR FIRST PARTY
INSURANCE CLAIMS-AN EMERGING TREND
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance has become an integral part of the existence of nearly every
individual and business in America. To some degree we all look to insurance
companies for economic security. In case of catastrophy we depend upon
them to relieve our financial hardships, and, for the most part, the insurance
industry has fulfilled this trust by paying legitimate claims fairly and
promptly.
When fraudulent claims are made, it is not only the right of the insurance
companies to challenge their validity, it is in the public interest for the
companies to do so. The insurance industry must be strong if it is to remain
dependable. It is to no one's advantage if the industry is weakened by
repeated payments of false claims.
On the other hand, the vast resources of the insurance industry give it
overwhelming power in those instances where an insurance company, for one
reason or another, refuses to pay a legitimate claim. The cases cited herein
indicate that wrongful refusal to pay claims occurs with enough frequency
that adequate legal recourse should be available to insureds in order to
prevent this practice. Unfortunately, however, when an insured resorts to the
courts for relief, the law, rather than balancing the inequality between the
parties, generally tips the scales even further in the direction of the industry.
In a majority of states, an insurance company can intentionally and
unreasonably delay the payment of first party' insurance claims with veritable
impunity. Regardless of the degree of anguish, harassment or financial
hardship imposed upon the insured, the insurer is aware that when a claimant
is forced to litigate, his maximum recovery is limited to the policy limits plus
interest. 2 Moreover, by pressuring the insured to a point of desperation, the
company might be able to force an inadequate settlement or avoid payment
entirely. 3 Numerous cases indicate that some insurers have taken willful
advantage of this opportunity to avoid their contractual obligations.
4
1. First party insurance refers to policies which indemnify the insured for a personal loss he
has sustained. Third party insurance refers to policies which protect the insured against liability
for injury to the person or property of a third person. It is necessary to distinguish these types of
insurance since the law generally imposes an entirely different measure of damages on claims by
an insured against the insurer, depending upon whether a first party or third party policy Is
involved. See text accompanying notes 90-94 infra.
2. J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, 16 Insurance Law & Practice § 8881, at 633-35 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Appleman].
3. For example, in Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1972)
(applying Illinois law), plaintiff was the beneficiary of her husband's life insurance policy. When
the insured was killed, the insurer refused to make the $5,000 payment due under the policy.
Plaintiff alleged that the insurer, knowing the plaintiff and her large family were in dire financial
circumstances, exerted economic coercion by inventing a non-existent defense and pressuring her
into compromising her claim. Id. at 2-3.
4. See notes 5-16 infra and accompanying text. In Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10
INSURANCE DAMAGES
In cases involving disability and health policies, certain insurance com-
panies have left insureds and their families destitute s and have engaged in
malicious and outrageous conduct for the purpose of avoiding meritorious
claims. 6 These companies have subjected disabled insureds to unnecessary
and burdensome medical examinations,7 have fraudulently attempted to
induce insureds into waiving their rights under their policies,8 and have
Cal. App. 3d 376, 392, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 87 (1970), after conceding that its treatment of the
insured claimant was deplorable and outrageous, the insurer readily admitted that it would not
hesitate to engage in similar conduct in the future.
5. In Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
before discontinuing payments under the plaintiff's disability policy, the insurer conducted a
financial investigation which determined that the plaintiff was barely making ends meet. Id. at
389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. The plaintiff surmised that this investigation was made to determine his
economic ability to legally resist the insurer's attempt to discontinue his benefits. Id. at 389 n,5,
89 Cal. Rptr. at 85 n.5.
In Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 321 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974),
the plaintiff's foot was severed in an accident. He was forced to go from hospital to hospital and
to switch surgeons because he was unable to meet the medical bills which the insurer refused to
pay. Id. at 458-59, 521 P.2d at 1107, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715. Ultimately, the plaintiff lost his dry
cleaning business. Id. He could not pay his rent. His utilities were turned off. His wheelchair was
even repossessed and he could not obtain medication to ease his constant pain. He later suffered
two nervous breakdowns. Id. at 459, 521 P.2d at 1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 716. The policy
application read "Protect Yourself Against the Medical Bills That Can Ruin You." Id. at 461, 521
P.2d at 1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 717. The insurer's defense was that it was entitled to await the
outcome of a workmen's compensation proceeding. Although the policy's application was
ambiguous if the insured had other coverage, the insurer knew that the workmen's compensation
claim was doubtful and the insurer could have placed a lien on this claim.
6. In Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970),
the plaintiff, a father of eight, worked 70 to 80 hours per week, earning approximately $289.
After suffering a severe back injury he submitted a claim for payments under his disability policy.
The policy provided for payments of $150 per month to last two years in the case of sickness and
30 years for a disabling injury. Despite innumerable medical reports indicating the plaintiff's
disability was due to an injury, the insurer, wishing to restrict its exposure to the two year
provision, insisted that the plaintiff was suffering from a sickness which he may have contracted
from a horse. Then the insurer discontinued payments after a year, by seizing on one physician's
statement that a congenital condition had contributed to the plaintiff's disability. Without any
investigation of this assertion or information as to whether the plaintiff knew of the alleged
congenital condition, the insurer accused the plaintiff of misrepresentation on his insurance
application form for failing to divulge his defect. It then demanded return of the payments
previously made. The next step was a proposal to allow plaintiff to retain the payments already
made in exchange for a complete release. Id. at 386-90, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83-86. At trial the insurer
stipulated to its liability under the thirty year provision of the policy. Id. at 385, 89 Cal. Rptr. at
82.
7. See Haas v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 332, 334, 41 N.E.2d 263, 265 (1941).
8. Apparently a common technique is for the insurer to contrive a non-existent defense to a
claim and then attempt to procure a release or compromise under the policy. See notes 3 & 6
supra; see also, Note, Punitive Damages For Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q.
444, 468 (1958) [hereinafter cited as S.C.L.Q.1.
In Egan v. Mutual of Omaha, No. EA C 15054 (Super. Ct. Cal., Co. of Los Angeles, Nov.
24, 1974), the plaintiff was injured in a fall from a ladder. After it became evident that the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
verbally abused insureds, 9 going so far as to fabricate accusations of fraud. 10
"[Unless prevented by the courts, it is to the interest of a disability insurer to
engage in protracted and unwarranted litigation creating undue stress which
may well precipitate the insured's death."''
In the area of fire insurance, the companies have subjected their insureds to
costly and time-consuming examinations for the sole purpose of delaying
payment.' 2 They have initiated allegedly unfounded prosecutions for arson
and fraud. 13 By wrongfully delaying desperately needed funds, insurers have
forced businesses into bankruptcy.' 4
Other examples of unethical conduct have occurred in cases involving life15
and accident 16 insurance.
Several jurisdictions have attempted to protect the public from these tactics
by permitting first party insurance claimants to recover amounts in excess of
policy limits plus interest. A number of states have enacted statutes which
provide for the recovery of attorney's fees and punitive damages when an
insurance company willfully refuses to pay a clearly justified claim. 17 Courts
in other states, most notably California, have allowed judgment for amounts
above the policy limits of first party insurance contracts.
Nevertheless, the majority of states still relegate the insured to the face
value of the policy plus interest, regardless of the circumstances involved. 28
insurer might be exposed to lifetime benefits, it unilaterally reclassified the plaintiff's disability to
a sickness and discontinued payments. The adjusters then harassed the plaintiff in his home,
called him a fraud and a phoney and then offered him a "larger check" if he would surrender his
policy. A discussion of this case is found in 17 Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America Newsletter
438-39 (1974).
9. See DuBois, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions, 42 Ins. Couns. J.
242, 244 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 389-90, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 85 (1970).
11. Appleman, supra note 2, at 636.
12. See, e.g., Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 479, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 178 N.W. 582
(1920).
13. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 571, 510 P.2d 1032, 1035, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 483 (1973). In Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 581 (1975), the defendant insurance company insinuated, as a basis for denying a fire
insurance claim, that the plaintiff was guilty of arson. This possibility had already been
eliminated by the defendant's own investigation.
14. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 489 (1973); Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 827, 442 P.2d
377, 379, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1968) (en banc).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. See note 109 infra.
17. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-3238 (1966); Ga. Code Ann. § 56-1206 (1970); Idaho Code
§ 41-1839 (Supp. 1975); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 22:658 (1959); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 375.420 (Vernon, Cum. Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 44-359 (1974); Tex. Ins. Code Ann. art. 3.62 (1963).
18. See Appleman, supra note 2, at 634; Note, The Widening Scope of Insurer's Liability, 63
Ky. L.J. 145, 175-76 (1975).
INSURANCE DAMAGES
Since it is to the advantage of the insurer to delay payment, these states tempt
insurance companies to engage in unethical conduct. From the insurer's point
of view, it has nothing to lose. At best, the company may be able to avoid
payment entirely. At worst, it will have to pay its original obligation plus
interest. When commercial interest rates are far above legal interest rates,' 9 a
company may even profit by the difference between the interest it may earn
while litigation is pending and the amount it will pay as damages. On the
other hand, the insured is faced with the strain of years of litigation, plus
enormous contingent fees and legal expenses.
This Note will examine the principles of law that have made courts
reluctant to grant recovery beyond policy limits and will discuss concepts that
are developing within the legal framework to allow more adequate and
equitable recovery.
I. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurance company and the
insured. For the sake of consistency and legal certainty, the general rules of
contract law have traditionally been applied to deny recovery beyond the face
amount of insurance policies.
Under the rule of Hadley v. Baxenaale, 20 consequential damages for breach
of contract are limited to those which arise naturally from the breach or which
were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was made.2 ' This
concept of foreseeability is very narrowly construed. It is not sufficient that
damages of a general nature are foreseeable. Unless the specific consequences
of the breach could be foreseen they will be considered too remote. For
instance, it can certainly be expected that an insured who becomes disabled
might suffer economic losses and compounded physical hardship when his
insurer refuses to pay under the policy. However, the specific consequences of
the insurer's breach, such as loss of a home because of inability to meet
mortgage obligations, are not necessarily foreseeable. Thus, under the strict
construction of the Hadley rule, consequential damages for such losses are
unavailable. 22
Even where specific consequences are patently foreseeable, the insured is
generally denied consequential damages because, in a suit for money due
under a contract, recovery is normally limited to the debt plus interest.2 3
19. For example, the legal rate of interest in New York is 6%. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5004
(McKinney Supp. 1976), whereas the prime rate of interest rose as high as 12% in August of
1974. Wall Street J., Aug. 22, 1974, at 4, col. 3.
20. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
21. Id. at 145.
22. See Leonard v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 436, 111 S.E.2d 773. 775 (1959);
Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 217, 178 N.W. 582. 583 (1920), Note,
Damages Assessed Against Insurers For Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev, 466
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Win. & Mary].
23. New Orleans Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. 378, 386 (1872); Reichert v. General Ins Co. of
America, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 851, 442 P.2d 377, 394, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 338 (19681 (dissenting




In addition to the Hadley limitation on consequential damages, the in-
sured's recovery is further restricted by the rule that punitive damages are
generally not available in a contract action, regardless of how willful,
malicious or fraudulent the breach. 24 Some insurers have been able to flaunt
justice by using these traditional and long established rules of contract law as
a shield against excess liability. 25
Recently, a few jurisdictions have begun to recognize the inadequacy of
these legal concepts which were developed long before the insurance industry
became such a powerful entity and insurance such an important factor in our
lives. California, particularly, is molding its law to respond to the need for
more equitable recovery. The few jurisdictions allowing recovery beyond
policy limits have used three general approaChes.
First, there are courts which take a liberal approach to pure contract
actions and allow recovery for damages proximately caused by the breach in
addition to the amount due under the contract. 26
Second, an action for breach of contract can be joined with an action in
fraud. 27 While this does not necessarily allow broader compensatory damages
than a strict contract action, it will permit recovery of punitive damages.
Finally, an action can be brought on a tort theory which allows recovery of
broad consequential damages. This approach enables the plaintiff to bypass
rules of contract law which restrict his recovery. 28 Some of these actions
involve new applications of pre-existing torts, while one, the tort of bad faith,
has been developed specifically for abused insurance claimants. 29
III. LIBERALIZED RECOVERY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
A major obstacle to the imposition of excess liability is the general rule that
compensatory damages for breach of a contract to pay money are limited to
In Haas v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 332, 335-36, 41 N.E.2d 263, 264-65
(1941), the plaintiff alleged that the insurer knew the plaintiff had entered into a disability policy
in order to keep a life insurance policy in force. When the insured became disabled and the
insurer delayed payments for one year, the plaintiff, unable to pay the premium on his life policy,
was forced to let it lapse. The court held that in spite of the fact that the plaintiff's detriment may
have been foreseeable, his damages were limited to the interest on the delayed payments.
24. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 400, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 02
(1970); see Diamond v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 528, 356 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974); J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts 327 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Calamari & Perillol.
25. From a policy standpoint, it is repeatedly argued that the insurer must be able to calculate
the risk it assumes and that if liability beyond the face of the policy were imposed, the public
would suffer the consequence of higher premiums. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201
F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1953); see Wm. & Mary, supra note 22, at 475. This argument is
untenable in view of the fact that excess liability has long been imposed in third party insurance
cases, apparently without such effect. See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra. Furthermore, if
the imposition of excess damages in a proper case serves as a deterrent to unethical settlement
tactics, the need for these excess damages would be obviated.
26. See text accompanying notes 30-47 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 48-73 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
29. See text accompanying notes 74-131 infra.
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interest on the debt. 30 This rule is founded on the following rationale. It
presumes, first, that the parties to the contract have equal bargaining power
and, therefore, are free to provide explicitly in the contract for any foreseeable
consequences; second, that money is always available at approximately the
legal rate of interest; and, third, that it is desirable to have a simple and
certain measure of damages. 31
While these assumptions may apply to commercial contracts for profit, they
have no application to first party insurance policies. In the first place, the
parties to an insurance policy generally do not have equal bargaining power.
Insurance policies are contracts of adhesion 32 and the disparity in economic
power between the parties can be staggering. 33 No matter how foreseeable the
consequences of nonpayment may be, the insured has no ability to provide for
them in the contract when he obtains his policy.
Secondly, the assumption that money is always available is illusory. Aside
from the fact that the commercial rate of interest might be double the legal
rate, 34 it is highly unlikely that a claimant who has recently suffered economic
disaster would be able to obtain a loan at all. 35
Lastly, it is the very certainty of this rule of damages which enables
insurance companies to take advantage of their insureds. Because this rule so
severely restricts the maximum available recovery, it is in the insurer's best
interest to delay payment as long as possible.
However, even where it is recognized that the rule limiting damages to
interest should not be applied in the context of first party insurance,3 6 the
insured will still be precluded from recovering in excess of the policy limits
unless he can show that his consequential damages were foreseeable within
the Hadley rule.37 Previously the courts had held that consequential damages
were too remote as a matter of law. 38 Recently there has been a trend towards
awarding consequential damages when they in fact are foreseeable.
30. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
31. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 68 Cal. 2d 822. 851-52, 442 P 2d 377. 395, 69
Cal. Rptr. 321, 339 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
32. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 24, at § 3.
33. Assets of property and liability insurance companies in the United States at the end of
1973 totaled about $84 billion. Policyholders' surplus, that is, the difference between assets and
liabilities, was approximately $27 billion. Insurance Information Institute, Insurance Facts 1974.
at 28 (1974). Assets of U.S. life insurance companies reached $263.3 billion by the end of 1974
Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance Fact Book 1975, at 63 (1975)
34. See note 19 supra.
35. See, e.g., Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452. 521 P 2d 1103. 113 Cal.
Rptr. 711 (1974), wherein the plaintiff borrowed some money to pay business expenses shortly
after his injury. However, he was not able to borrow additional funds. He was considered a
credit risk because he could not pay the medical bills his insurer refused to cover. Ultimately he
lost his business. Id. at 459, 521 P.2d at 1107-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
36. Reichert v. General Ins. Co. of America, 428 P.2d 860, 866, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724, 730 (1967)
(en banc), vacated, 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (en bane.
37. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
38. Haas v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 332, 335-36, 41 N.E.2d 263, 266 (19411,
19761
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The plaintiff in Reichert v. General Insurance Co. of America3 9 owned a
motel which had been substantially destroyed by fire. Although the insurers
were aware that the property was heavily mortgaged, they denied the
plaintiffs claim for indemnity. The plaintiff was forced into bankruptcy five
months after the fire because of his inability to meet the mortgage payments. 40
At its initial hearing of the case, the Supreme Court of California was
confronted with the defendants' contention that damages were limited to
interest on the debt. 4' The court examined the underlying rationale of the rule
limiting damages to interest and concluded that since the rationale did not
apply, the rule itself must be rejected.4 2 It reasoned that:
[w]here the owner of a heavily mortgaged . . . business property suffers a substantial
fire loss, the owner . . . may be in jeopardy of losing his property and becoming a
bankrupt. A major, if not the main, reason why a businessman purchases fire
insurance is to guard against such eventualities . . . . Insurers are, of course,
chargeable with knowledge of the basic reasons why fire insurance is purchased, and
of the likelihood that an improper delay in payment may result in the very injuries for
which the insured sought protection by purchasing the policies. 4
The court concluded that since the plaintiff's bankruptcy was foreseeable,
the defendants would be liable for consequential damages caused thereby. 44
Unfortunately, this decision was vacated upon rehearing when the court held
that plaintiff did not have a right to recovery since this cause of action had
vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. 45
The court in Asher v. Reliance Insurance Co. 46 held that, in addition to the
amount due under the policy, the plaintiff could recover lost rents based solely
on the insurer's breach of the policy as long as he could show that such
damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
of fire insurance was made and were proximately caused by the breach.4 7 The
foregoing cases indicate the willingness of some courts to recognize that when
consequential damages are foreseeable they should be recoverable.
Once the courts see their way through the mire of misapplied rules of
contract law, plaintiffs will hopefully be able to recover consequential dam-
ages for breach of first party insurance contracts. Because a majority of courts
see Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1953); Independent Grocery
Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 217, 178 N.W. 582, 583 (1920).
39. 428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) (en banc).
40. Id. at 863, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
41. Id. at 865, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
42. Id. at 866, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
43. Id. at 864, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
44. Id. at 866-67, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31.
45. 68 Cal. 2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1968) (en banc). Nevertheless, Justice
Peters, who wrote the court's original opinion reiterated, in a vigorous dissent, his contention that
the plaintiff was entitled to consequential damages. Id. at 839, 442 P.2d at 386, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
330.
46. 308 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (applying Alaska law).
47. Id. at 852.
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have not yet taken this step, insureds have attempted, with increasing
success, to recover excess damages by suing on tort theories.
IV. TORT CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Fraud
A cause of action for fraud has been approached from two distinct
standpoints-fraud in the inducement and fraudulent breach of contract.
When an insurer fails to pay a legitimate claim, some courts have allowed
excess recovery on the theory that the insured was fraudulently induced to
enter the contract or at least to keep it in force. This action is referred to as
fraud in the inducement. As a tort cause of action, it enables the plaintiff to
recover punitive damages. 48 By joining a contract claim with this tort claim,
the plaintiff can recover the proceeds of the policy as well as punitive
damages for fraud. 49
To prove fraud in the inducement, the plaintiff must show he was induced
to pay premiums in reliance on a representation or promise which the insurer
knew to be false or never intended to fulfill. 50
Occasionally it may be shown that the insurer made a representation which
was patently false at the time. For instance, in Sharp v. Automobile Club,"
the plaintiff renewed his automobile policy in reliance on the insurer's
representation that the policy covered medical expenses of the insured and his
family, regardless of whether he had other insurance. In fact, a year earlier,
the carrier had discontinued the practice of paying claims where the claimant
had other coverage.5 2 When the company refused to pay a subsequent claim,
the plaintiff sued in contract and for fraud. S3 He was awarded punitive
damages in addition to recovering the amount due under his policy. s4
In Sharp it was clear that the insurer never intended to fulfill its representa-
tion as to medical coverage. However, an insured is rarely able to prove that
an insurer made a representation, at the time the contract was made, which it
intended not to fulfill. 55 Normally, the insurer's intent not to pay becomes
evident only after the insured submits a claim. Proof of an insurer's intent at
the time the claim arises, however, is not sufficient to support fraud in the
inducement. Since it must be shown that the plaintiff paid his premiums in
48. Cf. Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (applying Alaska
law); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 929, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764,
768 (1968).
49. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 930, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
50. See id.; cf. W. Prosser, Law of Torts 685-86 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
51. 225 Cal. App. 2d 648, 37 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1964).
52. Id. at 650, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
53. Id. at 651, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
54. Id. at 651, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
55. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 385 n.2, 89 Cal.




reliance on the insurer's fraud, it is necessary to prove the insurer's fraudulent
intent at the time the contract was made. To overcome this obstacle in the
insured's burden of proof, some courts permit the insurer's fraudulent intent
to be inferred so long as the plaintiff can prove that some representation was
made at the time of contracting which turned out to be false after a claim was
presented.
Such a case was Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America.5 6 This
case involved a seventy-year-old woman who had purchased a disability
policy. After keeping the policy in force for five and one half years, she
suffered a stroke which kept her confined to her home except for occasional
visits to her doctor.5 7 Even though the policy provided "that the insured's
right to recover . . . 'shall not be defeated because [she] visits [her] physician
for treatment,' "158 the insurer claimed that the insured was not continuously
confined as required by the policy and terminated its payments to her." Mrs.
Wetherbee sued for the unpaid proceeds under the policy and for fraud. 60 She
was ultimately awarded $1,050 in compensatory damages and $200,000 in
punitive damages. 6'
The fraud involved the fact that shortly after she purchased the policy,
Mrs. Wetherbee, fearful that the contract could be terminated at the whim of
the insurer, returned the policy and requested reimbursement of her premium.
The defendant wrote her a letter assuring her that the policy could not be
terminated if she became disabled. As a result, plaintiff was induced to keep
the policy in force and subsequently purchased another policy to obtain even
higher benefits. 6 2
The court in Wetherbee held that the defendant's fraudulent intent not to
live up to the representation in its letter could be inferred from its subsequent
discontinuance of benefits. 63 Thus, the court greatly relaxed the plaintiff's
burden of proof regarding the element of intent. By doing so it indicated it
would not tolerate conduct which victimizes the weak and unsophisticated
who normally feel the greatest impact of financial harm.
Miller v. National American Life Insurance Co. 64 went even further than
Wetherbee in liberalizing the required proof for fraud in the inducement, In
Miller the plaintiff recovered punitive damages for fraud, based solely on the
insurer's contractual promise to make payment in case the plaintiff became
disabled. The defendant insurer claimed that a representation contained only
in the insurance policy is insufficient as a matter of law to support fraud in the
56. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
57. Id. at 926, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
58. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
59. Id. at 927, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 767.
60. Id. at 924, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
61. 18 Cal. App. 3d 266, 272, 95 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (1971); see Lascher, The Imposition of
Punitive Damages in the Enforcement of Insurance Contracts, Section of Ins. Neg. & Comp.
Law, Proceedings 1971 at 224 (1971).
62. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 925, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
63. Id. at 932, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
64. 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1976).
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inducement. It insisted that, as was the case in Wetherbee, specific false
representations distinct from the policy are required. The court rejected this
argument stating that an inducement is equally apparent whether it occurs in
the policy or a separate letter.
In response to the insurer's argument that there was no proof the insurer
did not intend to honor the policy at the time the agreement was made, the
court responded that, "[s]ubsequent conduct of an insurer in processing a
claim may support an inference of prior intent not to fulfill its representa-
tions." 65 In this case the insurer had physicians complete an ambiguous
questionnaire. The insurer would then construe the physician's response
against the insured as an excuse to automatically terminate payments. The
court held that this practice was sufficient to support the inference that the
insurer intended not to honor its promised coverage.
Because recovery would otherwise be totally inadequate, fraud in the
inducement should be available to plaintiffs who can prove the requisite
elements. However, it is by no means an ideal remedy. The insured's
detriment in these cases is deemed to be his premiums, not the consequential
losses he suffered because of the carrier's refusal to pay. 6 6 Thus, rather than
recovering his specific losses, the plaintiff's redress must be cloaked in the
form of punitive damages.
Moreover, this remedy is not based on the conduct which gave rise to the
insured's grievance. The plaintiff must prove that he paid premiums in
reliance on a misrepresentation by the insurer. Thus, plaintiffs have had to go
through ludicrous machinations to find some fraudulent act relating to the
making of the contract when, in actuality, the plaintiff's grievance concerns
the abusive settlement tactics which took place after his claim arose.
As an alternative to fraud in the inducement, fraudulent breach of contract
is a more logical and adequate theory of recovery because it is based directly
on the conduct which gave rise to the insured's grievance and it allows
compensation for all the detriment proximately caused by the insurer's
wrongful refusal to pay a legitimate claim.
South Carolina is the primary jurisdiction allowing recovery for fraudulent
breach of an insurance contract. 67 Its cases repeatedly affirm the requirement
that some wrongful activity beyond mere nonpayment accompany the breach.
There must be a fraudulent act. 68 But the term "fraudulent" is used in a very
loose sense. 69 Apparently any deceitful tactics on the part of the insurer,
65. Id. at 338-39, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
66. 265 Cal. App. 2d at 931, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 769-70.
67. See S.C.L.Q., supra note 8, at 445. However, other jurisdictions have also allowed
recovery on fraudulent breach of contract. See, e.g., Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health &
Accident Ass'n, 325 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1963) (applying Oregon Law); Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Savage, 296 N.E.2d 165 (Ind. App. 1973).
68. Felder v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 260 F. Supp. 575, 577 (D.S.C. 1966); Corley v. Coastal
States Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 316, 318 (S.C. 1964); Blackmon v. United Ins. Co., 111 S.E.2d
552, 555 (S.C. 1959); Yarborough v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 81 S.E.2d 359, 362-63 (S.C.
1954).
69. See, e.g., Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 135 S.E.2d 316 (S.C. 1964), where the
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accompanied by a failure to pay a legitimate claim, which results in further
damage to the insured will support an action for fraudulent breach in South
Carolina. 70
Very few jurisdictions, however, are willing to accept the theory of fraudu-
lent breach. With fraud in the inducement, the tortious conduct arises at the
time the contract is made and is independent of the breach of contract. 7 I
Thus, there are two distinct causes of action with two separate measures of
damages. The fraud cause of action allows recovery of punitive damages,
while breach of contract allows recovery of the proceeds of the policy. On the
other hand, fraudulent breach of contract muddles the distinction between
tort and contract. In essence it allows a tort measure of damages for breach of
contract and thereby directly contradicts the general rule that a tort will not
lie for breach of contract no matter how malicious or fraudulent the breach.
Although tort damages are available for the breach of certain contracts where
the breaching party is deemed to owe a public duty, 72 courts have been, until
recently, unwilling to apply this concept to insurance.73
B. Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress
In jurisdictions which recognize the tort, intentional infliction of emotional
distress presents a fertile theory on which first party insureds can base an
action for damages in excess of policy limits. The elements of the tort include
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, defendant's intent to
cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress 74
plaintiff was the beneficiary of a life policy on her husband. After her husband's death, the
plaintiff was told by the insurance company that the amount due under the policy was $5,096. 80.
Later, a friend of the plaintiff, who was engaged in the insurance business, inquired with the
insurance company and was told that the amount due was actually $7,296.75. Plaintiff then
forwarded her copy of the policy to the insurance company and received a check for $6,371.25.
Id. at 318. On these facts the plaintiff was held to have a cause of action for fraudulent breach of
contract. Although the insurer may have made fraudulent statements by misrepresenting the
amount due under the policy, it is difficult to see how the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss in
reliance on these statements.
70. Win. & Mary, supra note 22, at 472.
71. See Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
72. "There are certain classes of contracts ... from which the law implies duties, a breach of
which will constitute a tort, and 'in such cases an injured party may sue either for breach of the
contract or in tort' for breach of the implied duty. This rule applies in certain contractual
relations between principal and agent, bailor and bailee, attorney and client, physician and
patient, carrier and passenger or shipper, master and servant, and similar well-recognized
relations; but it is not every contractual relation which involves a public duty, the breach of
which will support an action in tort." Leonard v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 435, 11i
S.E.2d 773, 775 (1959).
73. Id.; see also Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 479,
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
74. It is not necessary that defendant's purpose is to cause mental distress. In most cases the
defendant's purpose is to coerce the plaintiff to do something against his will and the coercion
results in mental distress. For example, in State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d
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and severe emotional distress proximately caused by the defendant's con-
duct.75
Extreme and outrageous conduct is not defined by the nature of the
defendant's conduct alone. Certain factors make conduct tortious in one
situation which would not be so in another. One such factor is the defendant's
abuse of a position of actual or apparent power to damage the plaintiff's
interests. 76
An even stronger basis for finding extreme outrage exists when the defen-
dant knows or should know that the plaintiff-because of sickness, age, or
mental condition-is especially vulnerable to mental distress. 7
The presence of these two factors--defendant's position of power and
plaintiffs vulnerability-make the tort of intentional infliction of mental
distress particularly applicable to abusive settlement tactics by insurance
companies where severe emotional distress results. 78
When an insurance claim is submitted, the carrier is indisputably in a
position of power to damage the plaintiffs contractual rights. This is true
because of the grossly disproportionate economic resources of the parties,7 9
and because of the nature of the contract itself. Since an insurance policy is a
reverse unilateral contract of adhesion, 0 the plaintiff has little bargaining
power when he enters into the contract and virtually none after a claim arises.
At that time he has already performed his end of the bargain and must
depend on the insurance company to fulfill its obligations. The plaintiff's only
recourse, litigation, is little threat to a defendant that knows its liability is
limited to its original obligation under the contract.
Furthermore, the very risks insured against presuppose that the claimant
will be in an emotionally vulnerable position due to sickness or fears of
economic ruin when a claim has been filed.8"
Thus, the two essential factors which contribute to a finding of extreme
outrage are present in most first party insurance contracts. When an insurance
330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (en banc), the defendants were held liable for inflicting mental distress
because of threats to beat up the plaintiff and put him out of business unless he paid them the
proceeds he received from a territory which the rubbish collector's association had assigned to one
of its members. See Prosser, supra note 50, at 60.
75. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88
(1970).
76. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972); Prosser, supra note
50, at 56.
77. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972); Prosser, supra note
50, at 58.
78. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972); Fletcher v. Western
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
79. See note 33 supra.
80. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 24, at 5-6, 37 n.23. A reverse unilateral contract results
when one party performs his part of the contract in exchange for the other party's promise to
perform in the future. Id.
81. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972); Fletcher v. Western
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
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company's settlement conduct is truly abusive, the insured who suffers severe
emotional distress should be able to recover damages.8 2
Initially, recovery from an insurance company for mental distress was
granted only as an element of damages in suits for independently actionable
torts.8 3 However, in Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co,, 84
California became the first state to award damages based solely on the tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress.85 Since then, recovery on this basis
has also been granted by the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law,8 6 and by
the District Court of Appeal of Florida.8 7
Although intentional infliction of mental distress may be perfectly suitable
to certain first party actions, it does not apply to all cases where consequential
damages should be available. Since the tort is designed to redress invasions of
emotional tranquility, 8 the plaintiff will be precluded from recovering unless
he can prove his distress was severe.8 9 Furthermore, recovery is normally
limited to damages for the mental suffering itself and possibly punitive
damages. 90 It is conceivable that an insurance company's abusive tactics
82. "It is recognized that the outrageous character of a person's conduct may arise from an
abuse by that person of a position which gives him power to affect the interests of another; and
that in this sense extreme 'bullying tactics' and other 'high pressure' methods of insurance
adjusters seeking to force compromises or settlements may constitute outrageous conduct. . . . It
is also recognized that the extreme character of a person's conduct may arise from that person's
knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical
or mental condition or peculiarity." Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th
Cir. 1972) (citations omitted).
83. In Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F. Supp. 847, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1970), damages for
mental distress were held recoverable in an action for fraud in the inducement. In Continental
Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935), the plaintiff was allowed recovery for
mental distress in an action against the insurer for trespass when its agent came to the plaintiff's
home and verbally abused him, knowing he was ill.
84. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); see note 6 supra.
85. Note, Damages For Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the
Law of Tort and Contract, 48 Notre Dame Lawyer 1303, 1307 (1973).
86. Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
87. World Ins. Co. v. Wright, 308 So. 2d 612 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1975).
88. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 94
(1970).
89. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579-80, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480, 489 (1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78, 90 (1970). In fact, Fletcher has been criticized for allowing recovery for the intentional
infliction of mental distress without the substantial proof of severe distress normally required for
this tort. It has been suggested that the court found defendant also liable for the tort of intentional
interference with a protected property interest in order to bolster its weak reasoning regarding
mental distress. Keenan & Gillespie, The Insurer and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Mental
Distress: Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Company, 39 Ins. Couns. J. 335, 341, 343
(1972).
90. In Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972), the court held
that punitive damages were not recoverable since compensatory damages were sufficiently
punitive. A strong argument has been made that punitive damages should be available in such a
case because compensatory damages are not commensurate with the defendant's misconduct and
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alone could cause severe mental distress. In these cases an action for inten-
tional infliction of mental distress is appropriate. However, most frequently
the insured's mental distress is not a direct result of the insurer's conduct but
the result of financial losses or compounded physical injuries caused by the
insurer's wrongful failure to pay. 91 In such cases, intentional infliction of
mental distress permits recovery only for the invasion of emotional tranquility
while leaving the invasion of economic interests uncompensated. A more
realistic approach would base recovery directly on the economic losses,
allowing mental distress to be considered as a possible element of damages. 92
C. The Tort of Bad Faith
The tort of bad faith offers first party insurance claimants the most
promising theory of recovery. The tort theories discussed thus far have been
strained interpretations of existing concepts. None have been thoroughly
suitable remedies either because they are not based on the conduct which gave
rise to the plaintiffs grievances 93 or because they do not compensate the
plaintiffs specific losses. 94 The tort of bad faith overcomes both of these
shortcomings.
Courts in most jurisdictions impose an implied-in-law duty of good faith
and fair dealing in third party liability insurance contracts." During negotia-
tions of a third party claim, the insurer may have an opportunity to settle a
are, therefore, not an adequate deterrent. See Lambert, Commercial Litigation, 35 Am, Trial
Lawyer's Ass'n L.J. 164, 223 (1974).
91. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 398-99, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 91
(1970).
92. Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The plaintiff in Fletcher proceeded solely on a theory of
mental distress and did not attempt to prove the value of his losses which were considerable. Id.
at 402 n. 10, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94 n. 10. The plaintiff's family lacked food and clothing; the plaintiff
became delinquent in his house payments; he lost a real estate investment; his utilities were
turned off; and his wife, a mother of eight children, had to return to work. Id. at 398. 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 91.
In view of these losses, the court held that the insurer's conduct which gave rise to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress likewise constituted a tortious interference with a
protected property interest of the insured. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
This second tort would permit compensation for both economic losses and emotional distress
resulting therefrom as well as punitive damages. The court reasoned that a cause of action which
allowed recovery for all proximately caused detriment would engender greater public respect and
confidence in the judicial process. Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
Intentional interference with a protected property interest, however, has not gained popularity.
See Parks, Recovery of Extra-Contract Damages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 Forum 43, 52
(1973). This is probably due to the development in California of a more adequate theory of
recovery-the tort of bad faith. See text accompanying notes 93 et seq. infra.
93. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 66 & 88-92 supra.
95. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16
(1967); see Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle, 42 St. John's L. Rev. 544 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as St. John's]; see cases cited in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as 40 A.L.R.2dl.
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claim against its insured within the policy limits. Where there is a strong
possibility that the injured party will recover a judgment against the insured
in excess of the policy limits and the insurer refuses an offer to compromise,
the insurer is deemed to have breached its duty of good faith and can be held
liable to its insured for a resulting excess judgment.9 6 While some cases base
recovery of the excess judgment on contract law, others hold that the insurer's
bad faith refusal to settle is a tort. 97
The courts generally draw a sharp distinction between first and third party
insurance98 and refuse to impose this duty of good faith where a first party
policy is involved.9 9 Recognizing, however, that the duty of good faith must
apply to all contracts of insurance, the Supreme Court of California has
extended the tort of bad faith to first party insurance cases.1 00
As elsewhere, the evolution of the tort of bad faith in California began with
cases involving third party insurance. In Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co., 10 1 the defendant had wrongfully refused to defend a liability
claim against its insured and a judgment in excess of the policy limits was
entered against him. In awarding the excess judgment to the insured, the
Supreme Court of California explained that a duty of good faith and fair
dealing is implied in contracts of insurance and that the company would be
held liable for detriment caused by its breach. 10 2 Comunale was based on
contract law, and the court did not award consequential damages beyond the
excess judgment. ' 0 3 However, this concept of good faith and fair dealing was
taken one step further in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 104 There the
plaintiff lost her property, became indigent, suffered severe emotional conse-
96. See St. John's, supra note 95, at 544; see cases cited in 40 A.L.R.2d, supra note 95, at
196.
97. See R.E. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law 509 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Keeton].
98. See, e.g., Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy, 201 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1953);
Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 479, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Leonard v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, 437, 111 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1959).
99. The insured under a third party liability policy generally waives his right to defend and
settle claims covered by the policy. Since the insurer has control over the insured's rights, It has a
duty to protect the interests of the insured. Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 240-41,
104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914); see Keeton, supra note 97, at 508-09; St. John's, supra note 95, at 545;
Dubois & Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions, 40 Ins. Couns. J.
290, 293 (1973). Because this factor is absent in first party insurance, it has been held that the
insurer owes no such duty to its first party insured. CL Leonard v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 100 Ga.
App. 434, 437, 111 S.E.2d 773, 776 (1959). However, this reasoning is devoid of logic. In bo)
cases the insurer has contracted to protect the insured against loss. In both cases it has control
over the settlement of claims. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra. It should be liable for all
loss resulting from its bad faith, whether the loss to the insured occurs from legal liability or
otherwise. See Note, Damages: Compensating the Insured for Injury Resulting from Insurer's
Misconduct in Claims Dispositions-Is It Tort or Contract?, 28 Okla. LR. 394, 396 (1975).
100. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574-75, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037-38, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 485-86 (1973).
101. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
102. Id. at 659-60, 328 P.2d at 200-01.
103. Id. at 661, 328 P.2d at 203.
104. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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quences and even attempted suicide because of an excess judgment against
her.10 s The court awarded plaintiff the excess judgment in an action against
her insurance company. This case was significant because it held that the
defendant's conduct was a tort 0 6 and permitted consequential damages for
mental distress caused by the insurance company's unreasonable refusal to
settle the third party claim against the plaintiff.' 0 7
The most significant step in the development of the tort of bad faith was
Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. '0 8 There the Supreme Court of California
held that the duty of good faith and fair dealing applied to all insurance
contracts, first party as well as third party. 10 9 "These are merely two different
aspects of the same duty." 110
The duty of good faith and fair dealing creates an obligation in the insurer
not to deprive its insured of the benefits of the policy by withholding payment
maliciously and without probable cause."' The duty is imposed because
insurance policies are not ordinary commercial contracts." 12 An insurer has a
special relationship to its insured which derives from the great disparity in
bargaining positions of the parties and from the insurer's traditional role as
protector of its insured.1 3 Insurance promotes economic stability by enabling
individuals to provide for circumstances which might otherwise burden
society. 114 For these reasons the insurance industry is "affected with a public
interest"' is and has a legal responsibility to perform its contractual obligations
in good faith.
105. Id. at 428-29, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
106. Id. at 432, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
107. Id. at 427, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
108. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
109. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485. A court of appeals case decided
between Crisci and Gruenberg actually bridged the gap between first and third party cases.
Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972),
involved plaintiffs who were seriously injured by an uninsured motorist. Their insurer was aware
that the claim was worth more than the policy limit, but pursued its practice of paying such
claims "only as a last resort," even refusing payment after an arbitration award. Id. at 237, 102
Cal. Rptr. at 550, 551. The plaintiffs were granted compensatory and punitive damages on the
tort of bad faith. Id. at 244, 246, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 555, 557. This case did not strictly involve a
first party claim since the company "stood in the shoes" of the uninsured motorist. See DuBois &
Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions, 40 Ins. Couns. J. 290, 293
(1973). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs recovered beyond the policy limits directly from their own
insurance carrier, and the way was opened for applying the tort of bad faith to first party claims.
110. 9 Cal. 3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
111. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 486; Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970); see Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
112. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,
19 (1967).
113. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 404. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95
(1970).
114. See Win. & Mary, supra note 22, at 475.




The tort of bad faith embraces the first theory which adequately protects
the insured. Unlike "fraud in the inducement," it is proven by the specific
conduct which caused detriment to the plaintiff.' 16 Its primary purpose is to
redress all economic harm or compounded physical injuries proximately
caused by an insurer's bad faith settlement tactics."17 Unlike intentional
infliction of mental distress, a cause of action can be stated without alleging
severe distress."18 Since mental distress becomes only one element of damages
rather than the foundation of the tort, the plaintiff can recover for mental
distress on a lesser burden of proof. Furthermore, where plairntiff cannot
prove mental distress at all, he will not be precluded from recovering other
consequential damages."19
No doubt this tort will initially be attacked as being too nebulous. As with
all new theories of recovery, defendants will claim that the line between
tortious and non-tortious conduct is ill-defined. 20 However, as in all tort
actions, the determination ultimately will be one of degree, Juries should have
no more difficulty in recognizing the bad faith insurer than in recognizing the
reasonably prudent person in negligence actions. Furthermore, courts will be
aided by the bad faith standards which they have long applied to claims for
excess judgments under third party policies. 12 1
The minimal elements of the tort should include: 1) at least some economic
loss or compounded physical injuries, which are 2) proximately caused by the
insurer's unreasonable delay, and are 3) aggravated by circumstances which
evidence a bad faith intent to deprive the insured of his rights under the
contract. 122
This third element should not be interpreted to mean that the insurer is to
be denied its privilege to investigate claims thoroughly or deprived of legiti-
mate means to attain settlement. Settlement is a desirable goal of law, society,
and the parties involved. 1 23 However, abusive tactics do not encourage
settlement. Instead their purpose is to force the insured to litigate or to waive
his claim completely because of the economic impracticality of bringing
suit. ' 24
116. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
117. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578-80, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040-41, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 488-89 (1973).
118. Id.; see text accompanying note 89 supra.
119. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579-80, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041-42, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 489-90 (1973).
120. See Parks & Heil, The Tort of "Bad Faith"-The Impact of Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Company, 24 Federation of Ins. Couns. Q. No. 3 at 11-12 (1974).
121. Cf. Parks & Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" Is in Full Bloom, 9 Forum 63, 66-68
(1973); Note, Damages: Compensating the Insured for Injury Resulting for Insurer's Miscon-
duct in Claims Dispositions-Is It Tort or Contract?, 28 Okla. L. Rev. 394, 398 (1975).
122. Cf. Parks & Heil, The Tort of "Bad Faith"-The Impact of Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Company, 24 Federation of Ins. Couns. Q. No. 3 at 3, 12-16 (1974).
123. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 395, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 89
(1970).
124. Id. at 389 n.5, 392, 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85 n.5, 87, 89-90; see also Gruenberg v. Aetna
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Examples of bad faith which should give rise to excess liability include:
denial of benefits or procurement of a waiver based on wholly fabricated
defenses;1 25 unfounded instigation of criminal prosecution;12 6 requiring in-
sureds to incur the expense and trouble of submitting to examinations of
books and records once a decision to deny a claim has been made;'2 7 repeated
requests for identical information during an investigation;' 28 interference with
an arbitrator's award.1 29 Unreasonably extended delay should be sufficient
without extraneous circumstances where the insurer has a practice of forcing
its insureds to litigate in order to recover obviously meritorious claims.' 30
In addition to the amount due under the policy, excess liability should be
imposed for all proximately caused detriment, including mental distress and,
in a proper case, punitive damages.' 3'
V. CONCLUSION
There is a strong feeling among writers that the prevailing measure of
damages is grossly inadequate.' 32 One commentator has phrased the problem
as follows:
A person who buys . . . insurance is a consumer and deserves legal protection which is
realistic. If the law does not vindicate his reasonable consumer's expectations until
only years after battling well-heeled corporate entities and then only gives him policy
proceeds (plus interest) from which he must deduct the contingent fee and gnawing
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 573, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973); Parks,
Recovery of Extra-Contract Damages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 Forum 43, 47-48 (1973);
Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the Law of
Tort and Contract, 48 Notre Dame Lawyer 1303, 1312 (1973); Win. & Mary, supra note 22, at
468.
125. See notes 8 & 13 supra. See also Davenport v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n,
325 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1963) (applying Oregon law); Physicians Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savage, 296
N.E.2d 165 (Ind. App. 1973).
126. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 571-72, 510 P.2d 1032. 103S, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (1973).
127. See Bogert, Liability of Insurers in California Beyond Policy Limits, 606 Ins. L.J. 381,
391 (1973).
128. See cases cited at note 12 supra.
129. See, e.g., Smith v. Home Ins. Co., 178 S.C. 436, 183 S.E. 166 (1936).
130. See, e.g., Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (Ct. Common
Pleas 1970).
131. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462-63, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974); see Lambert, Commercial Litigation, 35 Am. Trial Lawyer's Ass'n
L.J. 164, 223 (1974).
132. See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 2, at 633; Lambert, Commercial Litigation, 35 Am.
Trial Lawyer's Ass'n L.J. 164, 225-26; Note, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance
Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 25 Hastings L.J. 699, 714 (1974); Note, The Widening
Scope of Insurer's Liability, 63 Ky. L.J. 145. 175-76 (1975); Note, Damages for Mental Suffering
Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 Notre Dame
Lawyer 1303, 1312 (1973); Note, Damages: Compensating the Insured for Injury Resulting from
Insurer's Misconduct in Claims Dispositions-Is It Tort or Contract?, 28 Okla. L. Rev. 394, 404
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expenses of litigation, then the insurance industry has every illicit incentive in the
world to fight the Bad Fight and nothing to lose (but policy proceeds plus interest). In
this context, compensatory and contract damages don't really compensate ...
Reparation plus admonition are urgently required .... 133
The causes of action described herein indicate that enlightened courts have
responded to this need. Recognizing that the proper goal of the law is to
provide adequate relief to the injured, these courts have molded the law to
provide just recovery rather than conforming the recovery to rigid legal rules.
They have liberalized contract law by allowing compensatory damages which
were previously not recoverable.134 Where contract law was not entirely
adequate, these courts have allowed recovery of compensatory and exemplary
damages under tort theories such as fraud 135 and intentional infliction of
mental distress. 136 California, which is in the forefront of the trend towards
allowing excess recovery, has developed the most suitable theory of recovery,
the tort of bad faith.' 37 Undoubtedly, it is merely a matter of time before
excess recovery is available to first party claimants throughout the country.
This Note began by affirming the importance of insurance to society
generally. It is surely to no one's advantage if the industry is weakened by
repeated payments of excessive awards. On the other hand, the advantages of
insurance are severely diminished if policyholders must frequently battle to
obtain the benefits which are rightfully theirs. It is the responsibility of the
judiciary to adequately balance the rights of the insurance industry against
the needs of the insured.
Phyllis Savage
133. Lambert, Commercial Litigation, 35 Am. Trial Lawyer's Ass'n L.J. 164, 225-26 (1974).
134. See text accompanying notes 30-43 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 44-69 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 70-87 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 88-126 supra.
